Monday, July 20, 2020

Lessons from the rise and fall of the Netherlands Antilles


Lessons from the rise and fall of the Netherlands Antilles

By Andrew P. Morriss and Craig M. Boise
July 7, 2009

Thirty years ago, one of the world’s largest offshore financial centres was the island of Curaçao in the Netherlands Antilles. 

The Netherlands Antilles was the domicile for George Soros’s hedge funds as well as for corporate entities used widely by non-Americans to hold US real estate and other assets.

Most importantly, however, the Antilles was the home of the subsidiary finance corporations that were used by virtually every major American corporation as part of a structure to access the cheap foreign investment capital of the Eurobond markets.

This arrangement benefited both the Antilles and the United States. As is generally the case in the leading OFCs today, the financial services industry contributed significantly to the Antilles total government revenues. At the same time, foreign debt investment in US corporations expanded dramatically. Despite the mutually beneficial nature of Netherlands Antilles’ finance transactions, however, the United States cancelled the tax treaty that facilitated such transactions and the Antilles’ financial sector all but evaporated within a few years.  

What happened?

A brief review of the history of the Antilles’ offshore financial sector offers some answers:

The Antilles’ financial services sector was the fortuitous product of three unrelated events. First, the construction of major oil refineries in Curaçao and Aruba to process Venezuelan crude oil in the early 1900s gave the islands a small but significant population of professionals that included accountants, lawyers, and civil law notaries. This nascent professional sector expanded significantly, along with the Antilles international reputation, when, following the German invasion of the Netherlands in World War II, a significant number of Dutch companies transferred their statutory seats to the Antilles as permitted by the law of the Dutch Kingdom.
Unsuccessful efforts to retain Indonesia as part of the Dutch Kingdom following World War II led the Netherlands to offer the Antilles a significant degree of sovereignty over internal matters, including taxation. During the 1950s, at the urging of an entrepreneurial civil law notary named Anton Smeets (who later founded CITCO, the worldwide financial services giant), the Antilles government took advantage of its newfound autonomy to pass legislation creating a ‘ring-fenced’ tax regime in the Antilles that afforded special tax status to foreign-owned corporations that were domiciled in the Antilles but derived most of their income elsewhere. This regime encouraged the formation of passive Antilles investment entities that were largely exempt from Antilles taxation on the income they earned.
Following World War II, the United States extended to the Netherlands Antilles the tax treaty it had previously negotiated with the Netherlands. Although the US extension of tax treaties to overseas territories of its treaty partners after World War II was rather routine, the treaty’s exemption of US source interest payments from the otherwise applicable 30 per cent US withholding tax combined with the Antilles’ ring-fenced tax regime made the jurisdiction a highly desirable location for entities receiving interest payments from the United States.
These three events set the stage for the Antilles’ offshore financial sector success. When US balance of payments deficits in the 1960s led the American government to encourage US multinationals to raise debt financing outside the United States for their foreign operations, American firms learned how to access the Eurobond market through finance subsidiaries created in the Antilles. When interest rates in the Eurobond markets later dipped below US rates, Eurobond financing became an appealing option for funding domestic as well as foreign operations, exponentially increasing the number of Antillean finance subsidiaries and driving significant growth both in the financial sector and the related sectors it supported. By the late 1970s, billions of dollars in corporate Eurobonds were being issued through the Antilles annually, saving US borrowers an estimated two to three per cent in interest costs.

As Antillean financial services firms became more sophisticated and their offshore customers grew more comfortable with the jurisdiction, new lines of business developed. For foreign investors, Antillean companies became popular vehicles for holding US real estate. Bearer shares in such entities provided investors anonymity and allowed the transfer of real estate assets without the transfer of title records in the United States. Moreover, the Antilles’ low-tax regime for foreign-owned companies attracted early hedge funds and captive insurance companies that were able to operate as Antilles corporate entities with only minor inconvenience. Notably, however, the Antilles did not lift its requirement that legal documents be filed in Dutch and it did not adopt laws that facilitated the formation and development of these new businesses. By failing to innovate in these markets, the Antilles eventually lost its initial advantaged position in both the hedge fund and captive insurance industries.

By the late 1970s, the Treasury Department, which had assumed oversight of tax treaty negotiations, became concerned that the United States-Netherlands Antilles tax treaty was subject to ‘treaty shopping’ – that is, it was being used by individuals and entities not physically resident in either country and for whom its benefits were not intended. As the treaty became what many within Treasury called a ‘treaty with the world’, US tax revenue losses mounted; US government estimates indicated that as much as US$100m per year in tax revenue was lost as a result of the treaty. Moreover, if the United States’ 30 per cent withholding tax on interest payments could be avoided merely by creating an Antillean entity to receive the payments, Treasury would have difficulty persuading foreign governments to sign tax treaty’s that included the expansive information exchange provisions it sought. Finally, US law enforcement officials also grew concerned about their inability to penetrate Antilles entities holding US real estate, and worried that proceeds of criminal enterprises were being laundered. Thus, the utility of a financial engineering strategy that had been acceptable to the United States a decade earlier was overshadowed by other US policy concerns and the United States attempted to renegotiate its tax treaty with the Netherlands Antilles.

Failing to sense the shift in the US’s cost-benefit analysis of the treaty, the Antilles government would not offer concessions sufficient to satisfy Treasury negotiators and the United States unilaterally terminated the treaty in July, 1987. (In response to an uproar in the bond market when US borrowers realised they would have to ‘gross-up’ their interest payments to cover the withholding tax on previously issued bonds, the United States hastily grandfathered outstanding bonds.) Despite a number of efforts to develop new offshore financial products, the Antilles has never found another market niche to rival the finance subsidiaries.

Lessons for OFCs 

Our research suggests two key lessons from the Antilles experience that today’s offshore leaders should bear in mind as the United States, the OECD and the European Union ramp up their efforts to regulate the offshore financial industry.

Offshore jurisdictions prosper when their products and services are perceived by onshore interests as offering mutual benefits. The US Treasury department encouraged Antilles finance subsidiaries for years, as their use was seen as a solution to an American balance of payments deficit. But the growth of any particular product can create interest group opposition within the onshore jurisdiction. In the case of the Antilles, the rampant growth of the finance subsidiary business resulted in the salutary effects of Eurobond market access being outweighed by new policy concerns (treaty shopping, tax revenue losses, money laundering). Ensuring that onshore governments continue to benefit sufficiently from offshore transactions and that they realise the magnitude of that benefit is thus critical to the survival OFCs. The public sector and the financial industry must work together to keep the jurisdiction’s laws competitive and to represent the jurisdiction’s interests with onshore governments and in international fora.
OFCs must continue to identify and develop new offshore opportunities. The Antilles had a thriving offshore industry, lost it in an instant and has yet to restore its vitality. In large part, this reflects the Antilles’ singular dependence on a tax treaty that was particularly vulnerable to unilateral cancellation. Because the Antilles had not successfully developed new financial products or services, the treaty cancellation proved devastating. Virtually every line of business in the offshore world depends on the arbitrage of differences in onshore and offshore legal regimes. To survive, industry and government in OFCs must cooperate to encourage flexibility and innovation in the expansion of offshore financial products and services where these differences exist.
It is axiomatic that those who cannot learn from history are doomed to repeat it. These are turbulent times for OFCs, and the leaders of offshore jurisdictions would do well to remember the lessons of the rise and fall of the Netherlands Antilles.

This article is drawn from Craig M. Boise & Andrew P. Morriss, Change, Dependency & Regime Plasticity in Offshore Financial Intermediation: The Saga of the Netherlands Antilles, Texas International Law Journal (forthcoming 2009) available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1368489 

Andrew P. Morriss, Chairman, is the D. Paul Jones, Jr. & Charlene Angelich Jones – Compass Bank Endowed Chair of Law at the University of Alabama School of Law. He was formerly the H. Ross & Helen Workman Professor of Law and Business at the University of Illinois,Urbana-Champaign. He received his A.B. from Princeton University, his J.D. and M.Pub.Aff. from the University of Texas at Austin, and his Ph.D. (Economics) from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He is a Research Fellow of the N.Y.U. Center for Labor and Employment Law,and a Senior Fellow of the Institute for Energy Research, Washington,D.C., as well as a regular visiting faculty memberat the Universidad Francisco Marroquín,Guatemala. He is the author or coauthor of more than 50 scholarly articles, books, and bookchapters, including Regulation by Litigation (Yale Univ. Press 2008) (with Bruce Yandle and Andrew Dorchak), and is the editor of Offshore Financial Centers and Regulatory Competition (American Enterprise Institute Press 2010).

T. +1 (216) 272 9187
    +1 (217) 244 3449
E. amorriss@ law.ua.edu 



Craig’s research, writing and teaching focus is on US international tax policy, offshore financial centres, and offshore financial intermediation. 

Craig M. Boise
Dean Designate and Professor of Law 
C|M|Law 
Cleveland State University 
2121 Euclid Ave. LB 138 
Cleveland, OH 44115 

T: +1 (216) 687-2300
E:  craig.boise@ law.csuohio.edu
W: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=345018  


Monday, July 06, 2020

George Soros and the Curacao, Cayman-based Quantum Fund


Peter Schweizer provides in Do As I Say (Not As I Do): Profiles in Liberal Hypocrisy a mention of the use of offshore vehicles by George Soros (aka Györg Schwartz), sponsor of the Panama Papers cybertheft: 




The shareholders of the funds are cloaked in secrecy (like a tax haven) and not publicly disclosed to you or me.  Schedule 13D for Textronix Inc. describes the Quantum funds before the SEC as follows:

The Reporting Persons
Quantum Industrial Partners LDC
         This statement relates to Shares originally acquired at the direction of Soros Fund Management ("SFM") for the account of Quantum Fund N.V. ("Quantum Fund"), a mutual fund principally engaged in investment and trading in securities and other assets.  As of August 1, 1993, Quantum Fund's entire position in the issue was transferred to a newly-formed operating subsidiary, Quantum Partners LDC, a Cayman Islands limited duration company ("Quantum Partners" and together with Quantum Fund, "Quantum").  As of April 6, 1994, all of the Shares held for the account of Quantum Partners were transferred to QI Partners, a newly-formed Cayman Islands limited duration company of which a majority of the outstanding shares are held by Quantum Industrial Holdings Limited, a newly-formed British Virgin Islands international business company ("Quantum Industrial" and together with QI Partners, the "Quantum Industrial Entities").  The principal business of QI Partners is investment in securities. The principal business of Quantum Industrial is investment and trading in securities and other assets, both directly and indirectly through its investment in QI Partners.  The principal office of the Quantum Industrial Entities is located at Kaya Flamboyan 9, Curacao, Netherlands Antilles. Current information concerning the identity and background of the directors and officers of the Quantum Industrial Entities is set forth in Annex A hereto, which is incorporated herein by reference in response to this Item 2. 

From the Soros Foundation funds were transferred into the Open Society Foundation, formed in 1993 from which a number of globalist causes are funded:


According to OECD Report on Abuse of Charities for Money-Laundering and Tax Evasion, charities may be targeted by criminals to launder the proceeds of tax crimes and other serious offences.

More about the Soros' use of offshore vehicles in tax havens in:

How Panama Papers' sponsor George Soros made billions offshore
Tracking George Soros Portfolio
Lifting the lid of the Soros money machine: In an exclusive journey through the labyrinthine empire of the master speculator, Stephanie Cooke and Charles Raw find gains are 'reallocated' to a charmed circle of associates
Wikipedia Quantum Group of Funds
Leo Zagami on the Panama Papers
George Soros and Quantum Fund
The Soros Saga by Nick Monroe


Saturday, June 20, 2020

Panama is not a haven for guns


        If you thought Panama was a place to get a license for transshipment of weapons, regulations are very strict and meant to discourage such activities.


1. Are there any restrictions on gun parts importation and exports ? What is permissible and what is not?

Panama's legal regulations on exporting and importing Gun parts and (firearms later on) 

Panama has very strict legal regulations on exporting and importing Gun parts and firearms - definitely more strict than the US - which make ownership almost impossible. Prevalence of firearms during the Central American civil wars and the Colombian guerrillas has forced the government to impose strict controls. Law 57 of 2011 regulates holding, carrying, exporting, importing, marketing, storage, brokerage, transportation and trafficking of firearms, ammunition and related materials by individuals and companies pursuant to article 312 of the Constitution.i

Individuals and companies are prohibited from


1. Carrying or having firearms and war elements such as the AK-47 and AKM.

2. Carrying or having fragmentation grenades, grases of mechanisms for release of biological, toxic, corrosive or narcotic substances.

3. Carrying or having offensive or defensive elements, devices, equipment and instruments for exclusively military not considered firearms, nor weapons of mass destruction which are similar to these.

4. Importing, manufacturing, marketing or installing accessories or modifying weapons of private use in order to silence their detonation upon their being fired.

5. Collecting weapons or elements of war, even when deactivating them or having one or more of their parts been extracted to make their working impossible.


6. Modify the firing mechanism of a private weapon transforming it into an automatic firearm, able to fire as a machine gun.ii


2. Are special permits / licenses required for us in order to do transactions with this type of goods ( military supplies, gun parts and firearms later on) 

Only companies of Panamanian capital (owned by Panamanians) with registered shares (no bearer shares) may import firearms, their accessories, ammunitions, cartridges, and related materials, upon previous authorization by resolution of the Institutional Directorate of Public Safety Affairs (DIASP) of the Ministry of Security. Importation of weapons prohibited under Article 14 will not be authorized. Authorized shipments may only be destined for sale within the territory of the Republic of Panama. Therefore, subsequent exportation of the shipments imported is also prohibited.iii

In addition the importer must send all weapons imported to DIASP for ballistic testing and when possible must have the serial number engraved with the letters PTY.iv

Requirements for a distributor license include among others:


1. Filing an application through an attorney before DIASP.

2. Be Panamanian by birth or naturalization.

3. Certification by Treasurer showing names of all shareholders.

4. Certification by accountant showing names of all shareholders and percentage of ownership.

5. Civil liability insurance from Panama insurer for at least $40,000.

6. Background police report of all shareholders and directors.


7. Not having been condemned by a tribunal for crimes against life and safety, freedom, family, economy, collective safety, State or humanity.v


Requirements for the brokerage license are:


1. Filing an application through an attorney before DIASP.

2. Be Panamanian by birth or naturalization.

3. Not having been condemned by a tribunal for crimes against life and individual safety, freedom, family, economy, collective safety, State or humanity.


4. Pay the $500 government license.vi


Fines for importing or selling firearms or related material without complying with Law 57 are of between $1000 to $20,000, plus imprisonment when provisions of the Criminal Code are infringed.vii

Companies involved in this business must also comply with all Ministry of Commerce, Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF-DGI) taxation, Municipal tax, Ministry of Labor and Social Security regulations described in our Doing Business in Panama brochure, like any other business.


Please also note that all applications are subject to the regulatory bodies' approval.  While we are diligent in following regulations in force, government officials may arbitrarily change rules and demand additional documents at any time during the application process.



3. Tax regulations on importing Gun parts? Import and export duty? 

The regulations and permits above mentioned are applicable for importation of gun parts and accessories. Each shipment imported or exported must be previously authorized by DIASP.viii

All imports are subject to a 7% value added tax (ITBMS). An import duty is also levied depending on the item. Customs brokers handle said information and they would require the Brussels item number in order to look up the rate in the government computer or manually which can take more than 1 week.




iArt. 1, Law 57 of 2011.
iiArt,14, Id.
iiiArt. 53, Id.
ivArt. 64, Id.
vArt. 26, Id.
viArt. 70-71, Id.
viiArt. 91. Id.
viiiArt. 65, Id.

Monday, May 18, 2020

Tax Havens, Tax Competition and Economic Performance


Tax Havens, Tax Competition and
Economic Performance

Low-tax jurisdictions play a valuable role in the global economy.  Economic research indicates that so-called tax havens provide a tax-efficient platform for cross-border investments, help boost saving and investment, and thus increase global economic growth. Tax havens also encourage good policy in non-haven countries.  In part because of jurisdictional competition, maximum tax rates on personal income have fallen by about 23 percentage points since 1980 and top tax rates on corporate income have fallen by almost 20 percentage points.  These policies have boosted growth and job creation.
The United States is the world's largest beneficiary of tax havens and tax competition, both because the U.S. is a tax haven for foreigners and because tax havens facilitate the flow of capital to the American economy. Foreigners have more than $11 trillion invested in the U.S. economy, including more than $7 trillion invested in America's financial markets. Nearly $1.3 trillion is placed in the U.S. financial system by Caribbean institutions. This money helps finance America's economic growth.
By Yesim Yilmaz
What are tax havens?
Tax havens are countries with very low tax rates set-sometimes as a matter of long-standing policy and sometimes as a recent and deliberate strategy to draw out-of-jurisdiction investment.  This definition is imprecise, but for a good reason:1 many additional characteristics including the nature of corporate registrations, requirements on beneficial ownership information, rules governing trusts, and the financial privacy companies and individuals enjoy could qualify a jurisdiction as a tax haven. In British Virgin Islands, Delaware, and Panama, one can incorporate a company within a few hours with little information about ownership and nature of work.  Switzerland, Singapore and Cayman Islands are among countries that generally do not disclose information on personal financial transactions.2  
Interestingly, the United States qualifies as a tax haven for both the federal rules that govern foreigners' income, and the state rules on corporate taxation, registration and privacy. Compared to U.S. taxpayers, non-resident aliens pay low or no taxes on investment income-an important characteristic of tax havens according to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, an obdurate opponent of tax competition.  The federal government generally does not tax the investment income of a foreign corporation if the earnings are unconnected with a U.S. trade or business, and foreigners are not required to pay taxes on their investment income from U.S. businesses unless they reside within the United States [Mitchell, 2001].
Furthermore, states offer many additional tax benefits designed to attract out-of-state investments, and the federal government generally does not have the authority to override these decisions. Nevada, Texas, Wyoming, and Washington do not tax corporate income; Alaska, Delaware and Nevada do not collect beneficiary information on registered companies; in Wyoming, corporations can take advantage of nominee bank accounts that protect ownership identity; and trusts in Delaware do not have public filings or recordings, and do not generally require accounting [ITIO and STEP, 2002]. Additionally, tax rules are "negotiable" in many states, and many large out-of-state investors are able to get concessions in return for investing within the state.3
The presence of tax havens has two important implications for the world economy: First, tax havens reduce the effective marginal tax rate on capital and, as a result, create more incentives to save and invest. Because the cost of doing business in (or through) tax havens is lower, businesses operating in or through these countries can undertake investments with lower expected returns or higher risks than those in high-tax jurisdictions. With these new investment opportunities, individuals will most likely consume less (or keep a smaller share of their wealth in non-income generating assets such as homes, artwork, or commodities), and save and invest more.  It is important to note that some portion of increased savings and investment represent funds that would have been paid as taxes in a high-tax jurisdiction, some of the funds are capital people reallocate from other sources in their portfolio to take advantage of investment opportunities that were not previously available, and some of the funds represent a shift from consumption and into new capital.
Second, tax havens curb the size of the public sector, and force governments to cut taxes and improve efficiency in public service delivery.   By providing a "low-tax" alternative for mobile taxable resources, tax havens make it difficult for politicians of the world to divert funds from the private sector to the public sector. In fact, since the 1980s, effective corporate income tax rates across the industrialized world have fallen by nearly fifteen percentage points, and statutory tax rates have dropped by almost 20 percentage points [Hines, 2005]. During the same period, tax haven activities as a share of world economic output have increased eight-fold.  Without tax competition from tax havens, the sweeping reduction in corporate tax rates would not have been possible (see Figure 1). Personal income tax rates also have fallen dramatically, with top rates in industrialized nations dropping by more than twenty percentage points since 1980 (see Figure 2).
To keep their tax bases intact in the presence of competition from low-tax jurisdictions, politicians must reduce public spending, cut taxes on mobile taxable resources, or shift a relatively larger portion of their tax revenues to less destructive forms of taxation imposed on labor and consumption. Needless to say, shifting taxes to immobile bases is a daunting endeavor with high political costs.  Taxing immobile sources would make the tax system more "efficient" (and evasion more difficult), but from the politician's perspective, tax hikes on bread, milk, and payrolls are extremely unpalatable. Not surprisingly, faced with jurisdictional tax competition from tax havens, governments have invariably chosen to reduce tax rates on corporate and personal incomes. For example, the reductions in the effective tax rates since 1980s are almost entirely due to tax rate reductions by governments (and a small percent is due to capital moving out). 
Do international tax rules matter?
Studies that look at the relation between foreign direct investment and after-tax rates of returns on investment consistently find a strong, positive correlation.  Among other things, this relation reflects the extent to which investors respond to tax incentives [Hines, 1999]. U.S. multinational firms invest fewer dollars in countries with high tax rates, whether direct taxes on corporate income, or indirect taxes levied on things other than the corporate income-for example payroll taxes, license fees, etc. [Desai, et al., 2006]. The use of indirect taxes expanded considerably recently, and businesses have become very sensitive to indirect tax rates in making their investment decisions.  One study finds that U.S.-owned affiliates of multinational companies tend to reduce their asset holdings by 7.1 percent in countries with 10-percent higher indirect tax rates (measured across countries).  A 10-percent increase in corporate taxes, on the other hand, results in a 6.6 percent decline in the total assets held [Desai, et al., 2004].4
Other evidence on the relation between international tax rules and business investment decisions includes the financing and structuring of companies, particularly since equity and debt are treated equally in low-tax countries5 [Desai, et al., 2004], low overall tax liabilities [Harris, et al., 1991] and low tax/sales ratios observed for multinationals with tax haven presence [Desai, et al., 2003].6
Because international tax rules matter for business investment decisions, governments cannot ignore the impact of lower taxes in other jurisdictions. Low tax rates elsewhere attract investors and reduce the tax base in the home country, and significant evidence supports the view that countries react to losing "market share" in foreign direct investment by reducing their effective tax rates. For example, the average effective tax rate in manufacturing (measured across 58 countries with significant U.S. multinational presence) has gone down fr
om 33 percent in 1980 to 21 percent in 2000 (Table 1).

Tax cuts instituted in response to tax competition appear to be the biggest factor behind the reductions between 1992 and 1998 [Altshuler and Grubert, 2004]. The evidence shows that countries suffering the greatest loss of capital were most likely to reduce tax rates. Additionally, those nations with high initial average effective tax rates cut tax rates more than the average country.
Effective tax rates in manufacturing exhibited another big dip between 1998 and 2000 and empirical studies suggest that company behavior (and not country behavior) helps explain the decline. In other words, companies took advantage of tax differentials by shifting economic activity among jurisdictions in ways that lowered their overall tax burdens. For this brief period, variables such as initial tax rates, share of foreign direct investment, and country size lose their explanatory power. The prevailing statutory tax rate, however, exhibits strong positive correlation with the declines in the effective tax rates.  High statutory tax rates cause changes in company behavior because of incentives to reorganize in ways that reduce effective tax rates.
To take advantage of low effective tax rates elsewhere, companies more frequently organize as hybrid firms (treated as branches from the U.S. point of view but incorporated as entities in the hosting tax haven country), or create ownership chains (which involve foreign affiliates owning other foreign affiliates in tax haven countries). While hybrids shelter payments of interest and royalties to a tax haven company from U.S. taxation [Altshuler and Grubert, 2004], ownership chains reduce tax obligations by indefinitely deferring the repatriation of retained earnings [Desai, et al., 2006]. Both strategies have become more prominent recently. Setting up of hybrids has been greatly simplified since 1997, and between 1982 and 1998, share of indirectly owned affiliates through ownership chains increased from slightly under twenty percent to almost forty percent of all affiliates [Desai, et al., 2003].
How do tax havens perform?
Between 1980 and 2000, foreign direct investment increased from one-half of one percent of world production to four percent of world production.  This increase in foreign direct investment has disproportionately benefited tax haven countries and helped lower-tax jurisdictions grow much faster than the rest of the world. The per capita real gross domestic product (GDP) in seventeen tax haven countries (places where U.S. multinationals frequently do business) grew by 3.3 percent between 1982 and 1999, while the average growth rate of per capita real GDP elsewhere was 1.4 percent [Hines, 2004].7
This calculation could overestimate the growth in tax havens because by definition, GDP is output produced within the borders of a country; in tax havens, this figure possibly includes some reported income (for tax-avoidance purposes) associated with output produced elsewhere. As an alternative, Hines [2004] reports the annual growth in per-capita gross national product (GNP), which measures the value of goods and services produced by a county's nationals.  Measured this way, tax-haven growth is still significantly higher than world averages: Per capita GNP in the world grew by 1.4 percent while in tax-haven countries it grew by an average of 3 percent every year between 1982 and 1999.
Despite their low tax rates (or perhaps because of them), tax-haven governments are not relying on low levels of tax revenue compared to the rest of the world (see table 2).  Governments in tax-haven countries consume a quarter of the total GDP-less than the burden of government in Europe and the United States, but higher than the global average. Empirical analysis of government size and other country variables (such as population, per-capita income) shows that while smaller countries have bigger governments, tax-haven countries have smaller governments controlled for their size and affluence levels. That is, governments of tax havens collect and spend fewer dollars compared to the higher-tax countries of similar size and income level.8
  

Are tax havens harmful?
Recent increases in international investment activity and the concomitant shifting of economic activity to tax havens (and other low-tax jurisdictions) have motivated a number of high-tax countries to undertake actions designed to hinder the flow of jobs and capital to jurisdictions with better tax law. For example, the OECD launched a "harmful tax competition" initiative in the 1990s, a scheme designed to penalize so-called tax havens. The OECD justifies its actions by arguing that extensive tax competition "undermines fair competition and public confidence in the tax system" [OECD, 2004].
In this context, the relevant question is not whether "tax havens reduce confidence in the tax system" but whether the economic success of tax havens comes at the expense of growth elsewhere-presumably in higher-tax countries.  There is no doubt that the threat of tax competition compels higher-tax nations to reduce tax rates.  However, this does not mean that tax competition is a zero sum game as the OECD appears to argue, or that the gains in the private sector are offset by the losses in the public sector.  If tax havens help channel funds towards activities that are more productive than the ways in which governments use funds, then the net gain to the world economy will be positive.9 In other words, the presence of tax havens could be complementary to economic gains in neighboring high-tax jurisdictions if tax havens force high-tax jurisdictions to organize more efficiently - or, even more importantly, to lower tax rates.
In a recent empirical study, using firm-level data from U.S. multinational firms, Desai et al. discredit the claim that the existence and use of regional tax havens reduces economic activity in high tax locations [Desai, et al., 2006a]. On the contrary, the authors find evidence that tax havens have positive spillover effects for nearby high-tax jurisdictions by providing a tax-efficient platform for investment. More specifically, they find that a one percent greater likelihood of establishing a tax-haven affiliate is associated with a 0.3 percent greater investment and sales in nearby non-haven countries.  Desai et al. point out that:
    "From the standpoint of host country governments, the ability of foreign investors to use tax havens in the same region has the beneficial effect of stimulating investment, even as it may erode tax revenue collection from any additional investment.  For governments that, on efficiency grounds or other grounds, would prefer to reduce tax rates on inbound foreign investment but are constrained from doing so by political or other considerations, encouraging the widespread use of regional tax havens offers a convenient alternative. The fear that the existence and use of regional tax havens might encourage firms to substitute economic activity away from nearby high tax locations receives no empirical support in the behavior of American multinational firms."
The finding that tax havens benefit neighboring jurisdictions is a special case of a more general rule: fewer restrictions on capital, through low taxation or removal of other rules, will make existing capital more efficient and facilitate a larger capital stock.  The consequent gains in growth and prosperity will benefit everybody. (It is, however, harder to empirically demonstrate the extent of the gains to the rest of the world, especially the indirect gains.)  Tax havens constitute an important source of such gains in efficiency because they are the only alternatives to the current "highly imperfect international system for the prevention of double taxation." [Teather, 2005, p. 31]  Teather notes that tax havens provide an environment where companies can freely pool international capital, without having to worry about multiple tax rules, and onerous investment regulations. Thus, tax havens increase the efficiency of global capital markets, and the gains in growth benefit not only the tax havens themselves and their neighbors, but also everyone else who eventually receives the fruits of growth through better products, more jobs, or cheaper prices. 
In response to the question, "What should a tax system look like?" tax havens would be a good starting point for investigation. A recent paper by Mitchell [2006] makes the moral case for tax havens, highlighting the relation between oppressive governments and oppressive tax systems. Mitchell notes that tax havens establish environments that are respectful of individual human rights, and offer politically stable environments with strong rule of law, and little corruption. In these ways, tax havens create higher standards of governance to which other countries must eventually adhere to in order to keep their tax bases. This picture is in stark contrast to the frequent description of tax havens as thug-filled countries primarily in the business of money laundering.10
What do tax havens mean for Americans?
Because the U.S. imposes taxes on foreign-earned income of U.S. based corporations, using tax havens for tax avoidance is relatively costly for American multinationals. Other incentives built into the U.S. tax system discourage tax haven presence for U.S. multinationals:  for example, in calculating their U.S. tax obligations, American multinational companies can deduct foreign taxes from their U.S. obligations and can claim credit, over an extended period, for any tax payments they have made in excess of U.S. obligations. Thus, American firms might be reluctant to take advantage of tax havens especially if the consequence is increased U.S. tax liabilities [Hines, 2004Hines, 1999].
Traditionally, U.S. direct investments abroad have been structured to take advantage of intangible assets like patents and trademarks (or to defer repatriation of income).  In recent years, however, U.S. manufacturing companies appear to have become more sensitive to differences in taxes across countries [Altshuler and Grubert, 2004]. The location of real manufacturing capital held by U.S. parents appear to correlate more strongly with the local tax rates (of the host country), and the transactions between the U.S. parents and their manufacturing subsidiaries in low-tax jurisdictions have been increasing.  Given globalization in trade, and increased competition from low-cost producers, moving capital (and even production) to low-tax countries might eventually become an unavoidable survival strategy for American companies.
What would the relocation of productive activity and capital to tax havens mean for Americans? On the negative side - assuming politicians do not control government outlays, the U.S. government will borrow more to cover short and medium term costs, putting additional financial constraints on current and future generations.  Competition from tax havens could also reduce the amount of foreign direct investment into the U.S. if foreign multinationals choose to invest in tax havens for reasons similar to those that influence the U.S. companies.
While low-tax jurisdictions put competitive pressure on the United States, the process of tax competition unarguably generates more benefits than costs for America. The United States is the world's largest repository of global capital. The Commerce Department reports that foreigners have invested more than $11 trillion in America's economy, including more than $7 trillion of financial investment [Nguyen, 2005]. Tax havens are a particularly important source of capital for the U.S. economy. The Treasury Department reports that foreigners have more than $3 trillion of capital in U.S. banks and other financial accounts.  As of March 2006, tax havens helped funnel nearly $1.3 trillion to U.S. financial markets [TIC, 2006]11 (see Table 3). Losing some or all of this capital to other tax havens - which would happen if the U.S. ceased its favorable tax treatment of foreign investors - would have significant negative impact on the U.S. growth and employment 12


On the plus side, firms are likely to pass on savings from low-cost production to consumers. Additionally, as the U.S. government loses some of its tax base, in the long run, it could become smaller and more efficient, and jurisdictional tax competition might force the federal and state governments to reduce corporate tax rates from their current (combined) 39.9 percent-which is the highest rate corporations face among the developed countries [Atkins and Hodge, 2005]. Such reforms would be especially desirable since lower tax rates would eliminate the incentive to shift activity from the U.S. economy.
Conclusion
This risk of economic failure associated with ineffective competition for funds makes tax havens important sources of economic discipline for the U.S. Tax havens will not be a problem for the U.S. economy, as long as U.S. remains a tax haven itself, with productive and stable investment environment.  In other words, presence of tax havens contributes to the long term success of the U.S. economy by making it harder for the U.S. to reduce the "quality" of the investment climate both for domestic and foreign investors. 
___________________________________
Yesim Yilmaz is a research fellow with the Center for Freedom and Prosperity Foundation.

See full text and footnotes in 

Saturday, April 11, 2020

The International Trade and Investment Organization (ITIO) #2



News Releases:

IT’S OFFICIAL: OECD TAX PROJECT DEPENDS ON LEVEL PLAYING FIELD
Finance centres expect joint working group to meet soon.
23 October 2003


EU CONCESSIONS THREATEN OECD TAX TIMETABLE

10 October 2003

EUROPE THREATENING OECD'S PLANS TO SWAP TAX INFORMATION
24 March 2003
SMALL STATES TACKLE DISCRIMINATION
20 March 2003


NEWS RELEASE ARCHIVES

   2002
   2001

ITIO in the News: 

FINANCIAL STANDARDS COME UNDER FIRE
Financial Times
01 May 2007
FINANCIAL CENTRES WORKING TOWARD ‘LEVEL PLAYING FIELD’
Barbados Advocate.com
22 October 2003

SWISS BANKING SECRECY UNDER PRESSURE

Swissinfo.org
15 October 2003
OECD HAVENS PLANS FACING COLLAPSE, SAYS OFFSHORE FINANCIAL CENTERS LOBBY
Daily Tax Report, Bureau of National Affairs
14 October 2003

OECD TAX PLAN FACES COLLAPSE
Financial Times (European edition)
10 October 2003

UNBEHAGEN DER STEUEROASEN

Neue Zürcher Zeitung
11 October 2003

DRIVE TO END TAX EVASION RUNS INTO NEW OBSTACLE
Financial Times (UK edition)

10 October 2003
OFF-SHORE CENTRES WORRIED BY EU SAVINGS BILL
Forbes.com
10 October 2003

A QUESTION OF TRUST

International Money Marketing

13 July 2003

CASHING IN ON A PARADISE ISLAND
Accountancy Age

23 January 2003

"ITIO in the NEWS" ARCHIVES


   2002
   2001

Commentary: 
A Level Playing Field for Tax Information Exchange?Richard J Hay, Tax Planning International Review
September 2003

Information Exchange and Global Economic Regulation: For Whose Benefit?
 - Dr Terry Dwyer, Australian National University.

Global Competition in Offshore Business Services: Prospects for Developing Countries - Rajiv Biswas, Commonwealth Secretariat

Offshore Financial Centres and the Supranationals: Collision or Cohabitation? - Richard J Hay, Stikeman Elliott (Chase Journal, September 2001)

WTO Compatibility of the OECD 'Defensive Measures' against 'Harmful Tax Competition' - Dr Roman Grynberg and Ms Bridget Chilala, Commonwealth Secretariat, September 2001

Potential WTO Claims in Response to Countermeasures under the OECD's Recommendations Applicable to Alleged Tax Havens
 - Stephen J. Orava, Baker & McKenzie, October 2001

Think Again: Money Laundering - Nigel Morris-Cotterill (Foreign Policy, May-June 2001)

The OECD, Harmful Tax Competition And Tax Havens: Towards An Understanding Of The International Legal Context - Professor William Gilmore, Faculty of Law University of Edinburgh. (from Commonwealth Secretariat website)

The Implications of The OECD Harmful Tax Competition Initiative for Offshore Financial Centres Paper - Commonwealth Secretariat (from Commonwealth Secretariat website)

OECD Curbs on International Financial Centres: a Major Issue for Small States - B Persaud (from Commonwealth Secretariat website)

The OECD "Harmful Tax Competition" Initiative - Michael P Devereux (from Commonwealth Secretariat website)
Speeches: 

Statements by ITIO members at the opening session of the OECD Global Forum, 14 October 2003

SPEECHES ARCHIVES


 2002
 2001

Contact Details
ITIO Secretariat
C/o Ministry of Industry and International Business
The Business Centre
Upton
St Michael
Barbados
Tel: (+246) 430 2200
Fax: (+246) 228 6167


Wednesday, March 25, 2020

Getting Paid by Your Panamanian Buyer



Getting Paid by Your Panamanian Buyer

Payment Terms and Financing Options to Maximize Sales While Protecting Against Nonpayment

Despite the size of the Panama market – and the fact that Panama uses the U.S. dollar as its currency - many U.S. exporters are unsuccessful in selling to Panama or increasing their exports to Panamanian buyers.  Frequently, U.S. exporters lose sales due to the payment terms they demand of their Panamanian buyers.

U.S. exporters should be aware that Panama's lending rates are far higher than those faced by companies in the U.S. They are losing sales to Panamanian buyers because they are frequently demanding payment either by Confirmed Letter of Credit or Cash In Advance.  This can result in the following situations:

1. U.S. exporter fails to win new sales contracts or loses existing Panama clients because other foreign competitors are willing to provide the Panama buyer with open account terms.  Some Panamanian companies pay more just to get 30 or 60-day open account terms.

2. U.S. exporter sells less to a Panamanian client.  One Panamanian company interviewed stated that it would purchase four times as much from its U.S. supplier if it were given 90-day terms rather than having to pay cash in advance.

3. U.S. exporter loses medium term sales contract because a foreign competitor assists the Panamanian buyer in achieving better financing terms.

While it is prudent for U.S. exporters to insist on secure payment terms, it pays for them to consider the broad variety of payment terms available to them in order to become as competitive as possible.

The purpose of this guide is to identify the main financing and payment mechanisms available to support U.S. exporters selling to Latin America in general and to understand the cost, advantages and disadvantages of each mechanism.  This guide is an introduction and the reader is encouraged to use it as a starting point in order to become more familiar with the subject.  In many instances, the use of expert help is recommended.  To that end, the following mechanisms will be examined in this report:

1. Cash In Advance;

2. Confirmed Letter of Credit;

3. Open Account Terms;

4. Open Account Terms with Export Credit Insurance;

5. Documents Against Payment (D/P) & Documents Against Acceptance (D/A);

6. Export Finance by a US Commercial Bank (US$ denominated);

7. Import Finance by a Latin American Bank (Foreign Currency denominated);

8. Lines of Credit Available from Latin American-based Development Banks;

9. Sales to foreign public sector buyers with foreign Central Bank Guarantees are also addressed.

This guide was authored by the U.S. Commercial Service and funded in part by donations from PNC Bank and FedEx, U.S. Commercial Service Partners.

The guide is published in English (for U.S. exporters) and in Spanish (for you to share with your Panamanian buyers).

English Version:   http://buyusainfo.net/docs/x_1197802.pdf

Spanish Version:  http://buyusainfo.net/docs/x_7091554.pdf


Full text in https://2016.export.gov/panama/financingexporttopanama/index.asp

See also Debt collection in Panama http://mypanamalawyer.blogspot.com/2014/07/debt-collection-in-panama.html






Libre de virus. www.avg.com

Wednesday, March 11, 2020

The International Trade and Investment Organization (ITIO) #1



About the ITIO:

The International Trade & Investment Organization (ITIO) represents small and developing countries across Europe, the Caribbean, Latin America, the Pacific and Asia.

We work for a level playing field in the trade in services.
We believe that all countries should be involved equally in developing new rules that affect them and should implement these rules to the same timetable, with the same penalties for non-compliance.

Aims:

The ITIO works for a level playing field in the trade in services, particularly in the development and implementation of new regulatory standards.

This includes, but extends beyond, taxation issues and entails dealing with a wide range of international bodies.

The ITIO is unique among groupings of small and developing economies, being funded entirely by members, which gives it total independence.

It seeks to take account of members' varying needs and stages of development and to produce results that are of benefit to all.

The ITIO works in partnership with the private sector where appropriate.

Live Issues:

There is a genuine need to combat the abuse of financial systems. The constant threat of terrorism and ongoing exposure of corporate scandals show this.
But action must be based on facts and fairness, not prejudice and preferential treatment.
If criminals are to be tackled effectively, international financial regulation must operate according to the principles of a level playing field.
Small countries with offshore finance centres are concerned at the behaviour of large, developed countries and of the supranational bodies they control, such as the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Financial Action Task Force (FATF), European Union (EU) and International Monetary Fund (IMF)
These too often seek to dictate terms to non-members while treating lightly or overlooking problems in their member countries such as Switzerland and Luxembourg, Hong Kong and Singapore, and Delaware and Nevada in the USA.
The OECD has been particularly guilty of this as it tackles harmful tax practices and the misuse of corporate entities.

Reports and Key Documents:


LITTLE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ONSHORE AND OFFSHORE, NEW ANALYSIS OF OECD DATA REVEALS
“End stigmatisation and let us into treaty network”, say small countries
Commonwealth calls for fair play

Towards a Level Playing Field, second edition.
Report undertaken by Stikeman Elliott on behalf of the ITIO and STEP.
MEMBERS

From an initial 12 members in March 2001, the ITIO now comprises 17 small and developing states as follows:
CaribbeanAnguilla
Antigua & Barbuda
Bahamas
Barbados
Belize
British Virgin Islands
Cayman Islands
St Kitts & Nevis
St Lucia
St Vincent & the Grenadines
Turks & Caicos
 Latin AmericaPanama
 PacificCook Islands
Samoa
Vanuatu



OBSERVERS
 InternationalCommonwealth Secretariat
 CaribbeanCARICOM Secretariat
Caribbean Development Bank
Eastern Caribbean Central Bank
 PacificPacific Islands Forum Secretariat