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Monday, May 18, 2020

Tax Havens, Tax Competition and Economic Performance


Tax Havens, Tax Competition and
Economic Performance

Low-tax jurisdictions play a valuable role in the global economy.  Economic research indicates that so-called tax havens provide a tax-efficient platform for cross-border investments, help boost saving and investment, and thus increase global economic growth. Tax havens also encourage good policy in non-haven countries.  In part because of jurisdictional competition, maximum tax rates on personal income have fallen by about 23 percentage points since 1980 and top tax rates on corporate income have fallen by almost 20 percentage points.  These policies have boosted growth and job creation.
The United States is the world's largest beneficiary of tax havens and tax competition, both because the U.S. is a tax haven for foreigners and because tax havens facilitate the flow of capital to the American economy. Foreigners have more than $11 trillion invested in the U.S. economy, including more than $7 trillion invested in America's financial markets. Nearly $1.3 trillion is placed in the U.S. financial system by Caribbean institutions. This money helps finance America's economic growth.
By Yesim Yilmaz
What are tax havens?
Tax havens are countries with very low tax rates set-sometimes as a matter of long-standing policy and sometimes as a recent and deliberate strategy to draw out-of-jurisdiction investment.  This definition is imprecise, but for a good reason:1 many additional characteristics including the nature of corporate registrations, requirements on beneficial ownership information, rules governing trusts, and the financial privacy companies and individuals enjoy could qualify a jurisdiction as a tax haven. In British Virgin Islands, Delaware, and Panama, one can incorporate a company within a few hours with little information about ownership and nature of work.  Switzerland, Singapore and Cayman Islands are among countries that generally do not disclose information on personal financial transactions.2  
Interestingly, the United States qualifies as a tax haven for both the federal rules that govern foreigners' income, and the state rules on corporate taxation, registration and privacy. Compared to U.S. taxpayers, non-resident aliens pay low or no taxes on investment income-an important characteristic of tax havens according to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, an obdurate opponent of tax competition.  The federal government generally does not tax the investment income of a foreign corporation if the earnings are unconnected with a U.S. trade or business, and foreigners are not required to pay taxes on their investment income from U.S. businesses unless they reside within the United States [Mitchell, 2001].
Furthermore, states offer many additional tax benefits designed to attract out-of-state investments, and the federal government generally does not have the authority to override these decisions. Nevada, Texas, Wyoming, and Washington do not tax corporate income; Alaska, Delaware and Nevada do not collect beneficiary information on registered companies; in Wyoming, corporations can take advantage of nominee bank accounts that protect ownership identity; and trusts in Delaware do not have public filings or recordings, and do not generally require accounting [ITIO and STEP, 2002]. Additionally, tax rules are "negotiable" in many states, and many large out-of-state investors are able to get concessions in return for investing within the state.3
The presence of tax havens has two important implications for the world economy: First, tax havens reduce the effective marginal tax rate on capital and, as a result, create more incentives to save and invest. Because the cost of doing business in (or through) tax havens is lower, businesses operating in or through these countries can undertake investments with lower expected returns or higher risks than those in high-tax jurisdictions. With these new investment opportunities, individuals will most likely consume less (or keep a smaller share of their wealth in non-income generating assets such as homes, artwork, or commodities), and save and invest more.  It is important to note that some portion of increased savings and investment represent funds that would have been paid as taxes in a high-tax jurisdiction, some of the funds are capital people reallocate from other sources in their portfolio to take advantage of investment opportunities that were not previously available, and some of the funds represent a shift from consumption and into new capital.
Second, tax havens curb the size of the public sector, and force governments to cut taxes and improve efficiency in public service delivery.   By providing a "low-tax" alternative for mobile taxable resources, tax havens make it difficult for politicians of the world to divert funds from the private sector to the public sector. In fact, since the 1980s, effective corporate income tax rates across the industrialized world have fallen by nearly fifteen percentage points, and statutory tax rates have dropped by almost 20 percentage points [Hines, 2005]. During the same period, tax haven activities as a share of world economic output have increased eight-fold.  Without tax competition from tax havens, the sweeping reduction in corporate tax rates would not have been possible (see Figure 1). Personal income tax rates also have fallen dramatically, with top rates in industrialized nations dropping by more than twenty percentage points since 1980 (see Figure 2).
To keep their tax bases intact in the presence of competition from low-tax jurisdictions, politicians must reduce public spending, cut taxes on mobile taxable resources, or shift a relatively larger portion of their tax revenues to less destructive forms of taxation imposed on labor and consumption. Needless to say, shifting taxes to immobile bases is a daunting endeavor with high political costs.  Taxing immobile sources would make the tax system more "efficient" (and evasion more difficult), but from the politician's perspective, tax hikes on bread, milk, and payrolls are extremely unpalatable. Not surprisingly, faced with jurisdictional tax competition from tax havens, governments have invariably chosen to reduce tax rates on corporate and personal incomes. For example, the reductions in the effective tax rates since 1980s are almost entirely due to tax rate reductions by governments (and a small percent is due to capital moving out). 
Do international tax rules matter?
Studies that look at the relation between foreign direct investment and after-tax rates of returns on investment consistently find a strong, positive correlation.  Among other things, this relation reflects the extent to which investors respond to tax incentives [Hines, 1999]. U.S. multinational firms invest fewer dollars in countries with high tax rates, whether direct taxes on corporate income, or indirect taxes levied on things other than the corporate income-for example payroll taxes, license fees, etc. [Desai, et al., 2006]. The use of indirect taxes expanded considerably recently, and businesses have become very sensitive to indirect tax rates in making their investment decisions.  One study finds that U.S.-owned affiliates of multinational companies tend to reduce their asset holdings by 7.1 percent in countries with 10-percent higher indirect tax rates (measured across countries).  A 10-percent increase in corporate taxes, on the other hand, results in a 6.6 percent decline in the total assets held [Desai, et al., 2004].4
Other evidence on the relation between international tax rules and business investment decisions includes the financing and structuring of companies, particularly since equity and debt are treated equally in low-tax countries5 [Desai, et al., 2004], low overall tax liabilities [Harris, et al., 1991] and low tax/sales ratios observed for multinationals with tax haven presence [Desai, et al., 2003].6
Because international tax rules matter for business investment decisions, governments cannot ignore the impact of lower taxes in other jurisdictions. Low tax rates elsewhere attract investors and reduce the tax base in the home country, and significant evidence supports the view that countries react to losing "market share" in foreign direct investment by reducing their effective tax rates. For example, the average effective tax rate in manufacturing (measured across 58 countries with significant U.S. multinational presence) has gone down fr
om 33 percent in 1980 to 21 percent in 2000 (Table 1).

Tax cuts instituted in response to tax competition appear to be the biggest factor behind the reductions between 1992 and 1998 [Altshuler and Grubert, 2004]. The evidence shows that countries suffering the greatest loss of capital were most likely to reduce tax rates. Additionally, those nations with high initial average effective tax rates cut tax rates more than the average country.
Effective tax rates in manufacturing exhibited another big dip between 1998 and 2000 and empirical studies suggest that company behavior (and not country behavior) helps explain the decline. In other words, companies took advantage of tax differentials by shifting economic activity among jurisdictions in ways that lowered their overall tax burdens. For this brief period, variables such as initial tax rates, share of foreign direct investment, and country size lose their explanatory power. The prevailing statutory tax rate, however, exhibits strong positive correlation with the declines in the effective tax rates.  High statutory tax rates cause changes in company behavior because of incentives to reorganize in ways that reduce effective tax rates.
To take advantage of low effective tax rates elsewhere, companies more frequently organize as hybrid firms (treated as branches from the U.S. point of view but incorporated as entities in the hosting tax haven country), or create ownership chains (which involve foreign affiliates owning other foreign affiliates in tax haven countries). While hybrids shelter payments of interest and royalties to a tax haven company from U.S. taxation [Altshuler and Grubert, 2004], ownership chains reduce tax obligations by indefinitely deferring the repatriation of retained earnings [Desai, et al., 2006]. Both strategies have become more prominent recently. Setting up of hybrids has been greatly simplified since 1997, and between 1982 and 1998, share of indirectly owned affiliates through ownership chains increased from slightly under twenty percent to almost forty percent of all affiliates [Desai, et al., 2003].
How do tax havens perform?
Between 1980 and 2000, foreign direct investment increased from one-half of one percent of world production to four percent of world production.  This increase in foreign direct investment has disproportionately benefited tax haven countries and helped lower-tax jurisdictions grow much faster than the rest of the world. The per capita real gross domestic product (GDP) in seventeen tax haven countries (places where U.S. multinationals frequently do business) grew by 3.3 percent between 1982 and 1999, while the average growth rate of per capita real GDP elsewhere was 1.4 percent [Hines, 2004].7
This calculation could overestimate the growth in tax havens because by definition, GDP is output produced within the borders of a country; in tax havens, this figure possibly includes some reported income (for tax-avoidance purposes) associated with output produced elsewhere. As an alternative, Hines [2004] reports the annual growth in per-capita gross national product (GNP), which measures the value of goods and services produced by a county's nationals.  Measured this way, tax-haven growth is still significantly higher than world averages: Per capita GNP in the world grew by 1.4 percent while in tax-haven countries it grew by an average of 3 percent every year between 1982 and 1999.
Despite their low tax rates (or perhaps because of them), tax-haven governments are not relying on low levels of tax revenue compared to the rest of the world (see table 2).  Governments in tax-haven countries consume a quarter of the total GDP-less than the burden of government in Europe and the United States, but higher than the global average. Empirical analysis of government size and other country variables (such as population, per-capita income) shows that while smaller countries have bigger governments, tax-haven countries have smaller governments controlled for their size and affluence levels. That is, governments of tax havens collect and spend fewer dollars compared to the higher-tax countries of similar size and income level.8
  

Are tax havens harmful?
Recent increases in international investment activity and the concomitant shifting of economic activity to tax havens (and other low-tax jurisdictions) have motivated a number of high-tax countries to undertake actions designed to hinder the flow of jobs and capital to jurisdictions with better tax law. For example, the OECD launched a "harmful tax competition" initiative in the 1990s, a scheme designed to penalize so-called tax havens. The OECD justifies its actions by arguing that extensive tax competition "undermines fair competition and public confidence in the tax system" [OECD, 2004].
In this context, the relevant question is not whether "tax havens reduce confidence in the tax system" but whether the economic success of tax havens comes at the expense of growth elsewhere-presumably in higher-tax countries.  There is no doubt that the threat of tax competition compels higher-tax nations to reduce tax rates.  However, this does not mean that tax competition is a zero sum game as the OECD appears to argue, or that the gains in the private sector are offset by the losses in the public sector.  If tax havens help channel funds towards activities that are more productive than the ways in which governments use funds, then the net gain to the world economy will be positive.9 In other words, the presence of tax havens could be complementary to economic gains in neighboring high-tax jurisdictions if tax havens force high-tax jurisdictions to organize more efficiently - or, even more importantly, to lower tax rates.
In a recent empirical study, using firm-level data from U.S. multinational firms, Desai et al. discredit the claim that the existence and use of regional tax havens reduces economic activity in high tax locations [Desai, et al., 2006a]. On the contrary, the authors find evidence that tax havens have positive spillover effects for nearby high-tax jurisdictions by providing a tax-efficient platform for investment. More specifically, they find that a one percent greater likelihood of establishing a tax-haven affiliate is associated with a 0.3 percent greater investment and sales in nearby non-haven countries.  Desai et al. point out that:
    "From the standpoint of host country governments, the ability of foreign investors to use tax havens in the same region has the beneficial effect of stimulating investment, even as it may erode tax revenue collection from any additional investment.  For governments that, on efficiency grounds or other grounds, would prefer to reduce tax rates on inbound foreign investment but are constrained from doing so by political or other considerations, encouraging the widespread use of regional tax havens offers a convenient alternative. The fear that the existence and use of regional tax havens might encourage firms to substitute economic activity away from nearby high tax locations receives no empirical support in the behavior of American multinational firms."
The finding that tax havens benefit neighboring jurisdictions is a special case of a more general rule: fewer restrictions on capital, through low taxation or removal of other rules, will make existing capital more efficient and facilitate a larger capital stock.  The consequent gains in growth and prosperity will benefit everybody. (It is, however, harder to empirically demonstrate the extent of the gains to the rest of the world, especially the indirect gains.)  Tax havens constitute an important source of such gains in efficiency because they are the only alternatives to the current "highly imperfect international system for the prevention of double taxation." [Teather, 2005, p. 31]  Teather notes that tax havens provide an environment where companies can freely pool international capital, without having to worry about multiple tax rules, and onerous investment regulations. Thus, tax havens increase the efficiency of global capital markets, and the gains in growth benefit not only the tax havens themselves and their neighbors, but also everyone else who eventually receives the fruits of growth through better products, more jobs, or cheaper prices. 
In response to the question, "What should a tax system look like?" tax havens would be a good starting point for investigation. A recent paper by Mitchell [2006] makes the moral case for tax havens, highlighting the relation between oppressive governments and oppressive tax systems. Mitchell notes that tax havens establish environments that are respectful of individual human rights, and offer politically stable environments with strong rule of law, and little corruption. In these ways, tax havens create higher standards of governance to which other countries must eventually adhere to in order to keep their tax bases. This picture is in stark contrast to the frequent description of tax havens as thug-filled countries primarily in the business of money laundering.10
What do tax havens mean for Americans?
Because the U.S. imposes taxes on foreign-earned income of U.S. based corporations, using tax havens for tax avoidance is relatively costly for American multinationals. Other incentives built into the U.S. tax system discourage tax haven presence for U.S. multinationals:  for example, in calculating their U.S. tax obligations, American multinational companies can deduct foreign taxes from their U.S. obligations and can claim credit, over an extended period, for any tax payments they have made in excess of U.S. obligations. Thus, American firms might be reluctant to take advantage of tax havens especially if the consequence is increased U.S. tax liabilities [Hines, 2004; Hines, 1999].
Traditionally, U.S. direct investments abroad have been structured to take advantage of intangible assets like patents and trademarks (or to defer repatriation of income).  In recent years, however, U.S. manufacturing companies appear to have become more sensitive to differences in taxes across countries [Altshuler and Grubert, 2004]. The location of real manufacturing capital held by U.S. parents appear to correlate more strongly with the local tax rates (of the host country), and the transactions between the U.S. parents and their manufacturing subsidiaries in low-tax jurisdictions have been increasing.  Given globalization in trade, and increased competition from low-cost producers, moving capital (and even production) to low-tax countries might eventually become an unavoidable survival strategy for American companies.
What would the relocation of productive activity and capital to tax havens mean for Americans? On the negative side - assuming politicians do not control government outlays, the U.S. government will borrow more to cover short and medium term costs, putting additional financial constraints on current and future generations.  Competition from tax havens could also reduce the amount of foreign direct investment into the U.S. if foreign multinationals choose to invest in tax havens for reasons similar to those that influence the U.S. companies.
While low-tax jurisdictions put competitive pressure on the United States, the process of tax competition unarguably generates more benefits than costs for America. The United States is the world's largest repository of global capital. The Commerce Department reports that foreigners have invested more than $11 trillion in America's economy, including more than $7 trillion of financial investment [Nguyen, 2005]. Tax havens are a particularly important source of capital for the U.S. economy. The Treasury Department reports that foreigners have more than $3 trillion of capital in U.S. banks and other financial accounts.  As of March 2006, tax havens helped funnel nearly $1.3 trillion to U.S. financial markets [TIC, 2006]11 (see Table 3). Losing some or all of this capital to other tax havens - which would happen if the U.S. ceased its favorable tax treatment of foreign investors - would have significant negative impact on the U.S. growth and employment 12


On the plus side, firms are likely to pass on savings from low-cost production to consumers. Additionally, as the U.S. government loses some of its tax base, in the long run, it could become smaller and more efficient, and jurisdictional tax competition might force the federal and state governments to reduce corporate tax rates from their current (combined) 39.9 percent-which is the highest rate corporations face among the developed countries [Atkins and Hodge, 2005]. Such reforms would be especially desirable since lower tax rates would eliminate the incentive to shift activity from the U.S. economy.
Conclusion
This risk of economic failure associated with ineffective competition for funds makes tax havens important sources of economic discipline for the U.S. Tax havens will not be a problem for the U.S. economy, as long as U.S. remains a tax haven itself, with productive and stable investment environment.  In other words, presence of tax havens contributes to the long term success of the U.S. economy by making it harder for the U.S. to reduce the "quality" of the investment climate both for domestic and foreign investors. 
___________________________________
Yesim Yilmaz is a research fellow with the Center for Freedom and Prosperity Foundation.

See full text and footnotes in 

Wednesday, March 11, 2020

The International Trade and Investment Organization (ITIO) #1



About the ITIO:

The International Trade & Investment Organization (ITIO) represents small and developing countries across Europe, the Caribbean, Latin America, the Pacific and Asia.

We work for a level playing field in the trade in services.
We believe that all countries should be involved equally in developing new rules that affect them and should implement these rules to the same timetable, with the same penalties for non-compliance.

Aims:

The ITIO works for a level playing field in the trade in services, particularly in the development and implementation of new regulatory standards.

This includes, but extends beyond, taxation issues and entails dealing with a wide range of international bodies.

The ITIO is unique among groupings of small and developing economies, being funded entirely by members, which gives it total independence.

It seeks to take account of members' varying needs and stages of development and to produce results that are of benefit to all.

The ITIO works in partnership with the private sector where appropriate.

Live Issues:

There is a genuine need to combat the abuse of financial systems. The constant threat of terrorism and ongoing exposure of corporate scandals show this.
But action must be based on facts and fairness, not prejudice and preferential treatment.
If criminals are to be tackled effectively, international financial regulation must operate according to the principles of a level playing field.
Small countries with offshore finance centres are concerned at the behaviour of large, developed countries and of the supranational bodies they control, such as the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Financial Action Task Force (FATF), European Union (EU) and International Monetary Fund (IMF)
These too often seek to dictate terms to non-members while treating lightly or overlooking problems in their member countries such as Switzerland and Luxembourg, Hong Kong and Singapore, and Delaware and Nevada in the USA.
The OECD has been particularly guilty of this as it tackles harmful tax practices and the misuse of corporate entities.

Reports and Key Documents:


LITTLE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ONSHORE AND OFFSHORE, NEW ANALYSIS OF OECD DATA REVEALS
“End stigmatisation and let us into treaty network”, say small countries
Commonwealth calls for fair play

Towards a Level Playing Field, second edition.
Report undertaken by Stikeman Elliott on behalf of the ITIO and STEP.
MEMBERS

From an initial 12 members in March 2001, the ITIO now comprises 17 small and developing states as follows:
CaribbeanAnguilla
Antigua & Barbuda
Bahamas
Barbados
Belize
British Virgin Islands
Cayman Islands
St Kitts & Nevis
St Lucia
St Vincent & the Grenadines
Turks & Caicos
 Latin AmericaPanama
 PacificCook Islands
Samoa
Vanuatu



OBSERVERS
 InternationalCommonwealth Secretariat
 CaribbeanCARICOM Secretariat
Caribbean Development Bank
Eastern Caribbean Central Bank
 PacificPacific Islands Forum Secretariat


Wednesday, April 13, 2016

Still waiting for #DelawarePapers and #Nevadapapers


For just $309, you too can hide your assets — in the U.S.


The website for Corporation Makers promises that owning a business can remain “your deep dark secret.”

“Do you wish to own land or other assets without anyone becoming aware of it?” it advertises.

Not a problem. All for as little as $309.

The pitch doesn’t rely on the loose rules of well-known offshore havens such as the Cayman Islands. It’s about Nevada.

Nevada is among a handful of U.S. states with liberal incorporation laws that offer many of the same benefits that have drawn business tycoons, politicians and money launderers from around the world to hide their wealth in exotic locales — a secret economy revealed this week in a series of reports based on leaked documents from a Panamanian law firm.

The so-called Panama Papers show how the firm Mossack Fonseca set up shell companies for the rich to shield their millions from the prying eyes of tax authorities and the public.

The firm’s most common destination was the British Virgin Islands, where it worked with more than 100,000 entities. But its seventh-most popular place to set up corporations — after island nations such as Seychelles — was Nevada, with more than 1,000 companies.

In pursuit of fees and other revenue, several U.S. states have competed with each other in recent decades to attract people from around the world starting businesses. The states promise minimal taxation and maximum legal protection and privacy, much like offshore tax havens.

“The mechanisms are pretty much the same here,” said Matthew Gardner, executive director of the Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy, a nonprofit in Washington. “There’s nothing special happening in Panama. Panama is pretty much a microcosm of what the U.S. is a willing partner in.”

Financial watchdog groups have dubbed the competition among states a “race to the bottom” that places the U.S. among the worst places in the world for corporate transparency.

“From the states' perspective, the end game is to raise revenue for the state by creaming off fees from large numbers of companies incorporating there — and the consequences be damned,” one such group, the Tax Justice Network, based in the United Kingdom, wrote in a 2015 report.

When John Cassara, a former special agent with the U.S. Department of the Treasury who investigated money laundering and fraud, was training foreign investigators, they would often ask about “this thing called Delaware.”

“You’ve heard the expression ‘follow the money’?” Cassara said. “Well, when the money trail leads to a Delaware corporation, it is almost a dead end for law enforcement.”

More than a century ago, Delaware sought to attract businesses by allowing companies to write governance rules that shielded management from liability and eliminated standard protections for shareholders.

Today, the state is the legal home to 1.1 million companies, 95% of which have their principal location in another state or country. Tens of thousands of businesses list the same Delaware addresses, home to their incorporating agents.

The businesses registered in Delaware include 65% of Fortune 500 companies.

But many more are limited liability corporations essentially unknown to all but the owners and their agents and lawyers, drawing enough criticism that the state maintains a “facts and myths” Web page.

“Delaware has a comprehensive statutory and regulatory regime to protect the public from improper behavior by business entities, just like other states,” it says.

State officials say that over the last decade or so they have cracked down on a variety of questionable practices, including the use of shelf corporations, or old shell companies that are sold to start-ups trying to pass themselves off as businesses established long ago.

Not in dispute are the benefits to Delaware: corporate franchise taxes — the fees for maintaining a business — provide the state nearly $1 billion a year, or a quarter of its annual revenue.

That success has drawn the attention of other states looking for sources of revenue.

In the 1980s, Nevada began revamping its corporate laws to minimize liability for management.

Among its biggest draws is secrecy.

The state allows “nominees” to file company documents while the identities of the true owners remain hidden.

That is a key selling point for many incorporation companies that specialize in establishing businesses in Nevada.

A common practice is for a nominee to be “appointed in the morning,” file state paperwork by lunch, and then resign by dinner, according to the incorporation site www.Nevada123.com.

“The less the public knows about your affairs, the less engaged they can become,” the site says.

Nevada and other states say their rules are not meant to encourage illegal activity.

But secretive entities have long been used to move and hide money. Hard-to-trace shell companies have served as fronts for controversial foreign buyers of top-end real estate in cities including New York and Miami.

Federal rules have also allowed U.S. political donors to hide campaign contributions by donating to super PACs through limited liability corporations.

One prominent Republican donor, the gambling industry magnate Sheldon Adelson, tried to hide behind secrecy protections when he purchased the Las Vegas Review-Journal last year.

The company’s journalists were informed one day that their new owner was a company called the “News + Media Capital Group,” which had been recently incorporated in Delaware with “undisclosed financial backers with expertise in the media industry.”


Corporate documents listed Michael Schroeder, a Connecticut newspaper publisher, as the company’s manager but did not name the owner, whose identity was only revealed after the newsroom revolted and its reporters launched their own investigation.

Adelson had originally denied buying the paper.

Gardner, of the financial watchdog nonprofit, explained the cost of such secrecy: “There is a basic matter of democratic distrust when you don’t know who’s running things.”

Secrecy has been allowed to flourish in the U.S. even as the government tries to improve corporate transparency abroad in an effort to cut off funding for terrorism, drug trafficking and other illicit activity.

But pressure is building on federal and state officials to address corporate secrecy. This week, U.S. Treasury officials said they could soon issue a rule change that has been in the works to require banks and other financial institutions to obtain information about the owners of companies.

News reports about the Panama Papers this week have already put some state officials on the defensive, with some critics calling for federal requirements that states disclose businesses’ true owners.

Wyoming launched an audit Monday of 24 companies in the state linked to Mossack Fonseca and discovered they had failed to provide “required statutory information for performing the duties of a registered agent under Wyoming law.”

Wyoming Secretary of State Ed Murray promised to fight fraud and possibly seek changes in state law. At the same time, he defended the way Wyoming did business.

“I oppose a one-size-fits-all federal law mandating the dissolving of privacy protections,” he said in a statement. “We are not naive as to the importance of the release of these 'Panama Papers,' but we will not compromise the privacy of our customers.”

See full text and comments in http://www.latimes.com/world/la-fg-panama-papers-americans-20160407-story.html


Monday, June 25, 2012

Most important providers of financial secrecy are in world's biggest and wealthiest countries


Campaigners say OECD action against banking secrecy has failed

06 October 2011

The campaigning body Tax Justice Network has published a report claiming that the OECD nations have failed to make any practical difference to international banking secrecy.

In its report, The 2011 Financial Secrecy Index, TJN ranks 73 international financial centres according to its estimates of their secrecy and the quantity of money that flows through them. It claims to deliver a "politically neutral" result.

The index uses fifteen factors to calculate the secrecy index of each jurisdiction. They include knowledge of beneficial ownership, corporate transparency regulation, regulatory efficiency, and international standards and cooperation.

According to TJN, its ranking reveals that "the world's most important providers of financial secrecy are not small, palm-fringed islands as many suppose, but some of the world's biggest and wealthiest countries". Indeed it puts countries such as the USA high on the secrecy list - not a view much promoted by the OECD's Global Tax Forum, the body responsible for the official campaign for international exchange of tax collection information.
Each of the 73 jurisdictions examined has its own report on the TJN website. Switzerland and the Cayman Islands are at the top of the list. This is mainly because of the large cash volumes they handle, although TJN also dismissed both jurisdictions' information exchange agreements as "ineffective".

Other leaders in the field are Luxembourg, Hong Kong, Delaware in the USA, Jersey and Bahrain. The UK, Japan and Germany are not far behind.

Sources



Tax Justice Network Financial Secrecy Index http://www.financialsecrecyindex.com/



2011 Results



Telegraph

Wednesday, October 14, 2009

Panama - a trust jurisdiction in a Civil Law region


.

PANAMA – A TRUST JURISDICTION IN A CIVIL LAW REGION

Panama is traditionally considered a Civil Law jurisdiction like the rest Latin America where judges construe the law as stated in Codes. However, its long relationship with the United States makes it an exception in a region where laws originate from French Civil Code. As of this day:

  • the U.S. Dollar is currency of legal tender since 1904,

  • the 1917 law of commercial paper is based on the U.S. Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law,

  • the 1927 corporation law is based on the law of Delaware of the time,

  • trusts may be formed since 1925.

The original 1925 law was changed in 1941 and finally its current version of Law 1 of 1984. Its main features are:

1. Simplicity of execution: Trust deeds may be granted by private document, granted by the settlor before a Notary Public anywhere in the world.

2. Contractual freedom: A settlor can grant a deed with any clauses or distribution plans as long as they are not contrary to law, morality or public interest. This extends to allow the possibility of post-mortem distributions different from those of the settlor's estate laws or forced heirship rules. The law also allows practitioners to draft trust deeds for execution of Sharia-complaint trusts or appointing a protector as a limit to trustee powers.

3. Duration: The duration of the trust can be indefinite, which represents a change from the rule against perpetuities in the previous 1941 law.

4. Confidentiality: Trust deeds do not need to be made public by their registration (unless real estate in Panama is being settled). The trustee and its employees are subject to a duty of confidentiality. Breaches of said duty are subject to imprisonment or monetary fines.

5. No citizenship requirements: Individuals or entities of any country can serve as settlors, trustees or beneficiaries. None of the parties need to be Panamanian, except for the attorney which serves as resident agent.

6. No trustee requirements: Any capable person or entity may serve as trustee and does not need to be authorised by a government authority, unless they market themselves as such on a regular basis. Trustees serving as commercial custodians may seek to apply for a trustee license from the Superintendent of Banks in which case the trustee is subject to quarterly reporting, capital adequacy ratios and know-your-customer rules similar to those of banks.

7. Charitable or for-profit purpose: Trust provisions may appoint a general class of beneficiaries or unborn beneficiaries. Alternatively, trusts may also serve for commercial transactions, such as securitization of receivables or other assets.

8. Revocability option: Trusts are irrevocable by default, unless parties decide otherwise.

9. Separate patrimony: Trust assets are deemed as separate from assets of the settlor and trustee. Therefore, creditors of the settlor1 or trustee – such as commercial creditors or inheritance creditors in probate cases - cannot seize assets settled. Trust assets may be seized for liabilities incurred or damages caused from the performance of trust or by third parties when assets have been transfered or withheld by fraud.

10. Low local taxation: Income earned from assets located abroad or funds held in any bank in Panama are exempt from local Panama taxes. However, legislation from the countries of residence or citizenship of the settlor or trustee may impose additional tax obligations.

11. Minimum reporting requirements: Trusts without assets in Panama or not earning income in Panama are exempt from having to file tax returns or financial statements. Trustees are required to render account of their performance to the beneficiaries and maintain a duty of care under the bonus pater familiae standard.

Conflicts of Laws

The trust is subject to Panama law once it is stated in the trust deed. However, parties may agree to settle disputes under foreign law.

Disputes by default are resolved by Panama courts under a summary procedure with a shorter evidentiary stage. Parties may agree to have controversies settled by arbitration or before foreign courts.

Panama trusts may be transferred to another country when the trust deed allows so.

Foreign trusts may be subject to Panama law, as long as the trustee alone or jointly with the settlor, states so.

Foreign trusts are subject to Panama law, when enforcing their rights in court.2

Panama is not a member of The Hague 1985 Convention on the Law Applicable to Trusts and on their Recognition. Panama courts have cooperated in international service of process under international comity rules, but strictly enforce confidentiality and trust privilege granted by trust law3. National treatment is granted to nationals under Bilateral Investment Treaties (with U.S. and other countries) and Free Trade Agreements (Singapore and – pending ratification by Congress - U.S.).

1A vehicle held in trust by a trustee company for the benefit of its driver, cannot be seized by a government-owned bank to satisfy consumer debt of said driver. Decision of March 2, 2004, by Supreme Court of Justice – Administrative Section, Case 281-08.

2When a will granted in Panama by a St. Kitts national which appointed a St. Kitts & Nevis trust as heir. The trustee of the Nevis trust – not the trust itself - was held to be the rightful representative of the heir, because both Panama and St. Kitts trust laws consider the trust to be a relationship between settlor, trustee and beneficiary but not a separate entity in itself. Decision of May 4, 2007, by First Superior Tribunal of Justice, In re Estate of Wilson Charles Lucom.

3Two Panamanian principals of a BVI trustee company may answer the deposition requested by Polish authorities through exequatur but not provide copies of the trust documents. Decision of December 30, 2004, by Supreme Court of Justice – General Affairs Section, Case 110-04.




See also:
Should You Use an Offshore Entity?
US forms required for Panama trust and other non-US entities

Tuesday, August 04, 2009

NY Assistant DA: “U.S. financial transparency: trying to catch up to Panama.”

Adam S. Kaufmann, Assistant District Attorney for New York County State of New York, explained at a hearing why a U.S. company is as good as an offshore company for hiding the identity of its non-U.S. owners:

We regularly speak to law enforcement agents and prosecutors around the world. It is difficult to speak with moral authority in criticizing offshore bank secrecy jurisdictions when they can point an accusing finger back at us. The British Virgin Islands is a well-known (in law enforcement circles) bastion for dirty shell companies, but even the British Virgin Islands can level criticism at the lack of transparency in the incorporation processes in our states. That we were deemed “non-compliant” by the Financial Action Task Force is an embarrassment. That we have made no progress in the three years since then is absurd. Our statement of national transparency standards should be something more than: “U.S. financial transparency: Better than Lichtenstein and trying to catch up to Panama.” Simply put, we lag behind many other countries in the world in this regard, and it makes our statements concerning transparency and tax evasion ring hollow and hypocritical.
Foreign law enforcement authorities even refer to certain states as “offshore U.S. jurisdictions.” And when asked, I am hard-pressed to define why these well-known states are any different from Cayman or the British Virgin Islands. The Committee should also know the imprimatur of respectability that a certificate of incorporation from a U.S. state carries with it, and the access it gives a foreign citizen to open bank accounts and engage in all manner of business, both legitimate and otherwise. And, for many foreign persons wishing to hide their income in an “offshore jurisdiction,” there is no need to turn to a Caribbean hide-away. In one case where we rendered assistance to foreign prosecutors, we were able to connect the head of a foreign central bank to an “offshore” Delaware corporation. He used the corporate entity to open a bank account in Florida. He used black market money systems (prosecuted in New York) to move funds to this secret account he held in Florida. By obtaining a corporate entity, this corrupt official could rest assured that his funds would be safe in the United States, and his name would not easily be linked to the corporation. I am hard-pressed to find a difference between his use of a Delaware corporation to open a Florida bank account and the use by a U.S. taxpayer of a Lichtenstein corporation to open a Swiss bank account. At the end of the day, both systems provide a security blanket of anonymity for those who seek it
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Examining State Business Incorporation Practices: A Discussion of the Incorporation Transparency and Law Enforcement Assistance Act
Thursday, June 18, 2009 02:30 PM Dirksen Senate Office Building, room 342 The hearing will examine the impact of the "Incorporation Transparency and Law Enforcement Assistance Act," S. 569, which would create a minimum standard--and greater transparency--for the ownership information businesses have to provide to states when they form a business.
Member Statements
Senator Joseph I. Lieberman [View PDF]
Witnesses
Panel 1
Janice Ayala [view testimony] Deputy Assistant Director, Office of Investigations, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Jennifer Shasky Calvery [view testimony] Senior Counsel to the Deputy Attorney General U.S. Department of Justice
The Honorable Elaine F. Marshall [view testimony] Secretary of State State of North Carolina
Adam S. Kaufmann [view testimony] Assistant District Attorney for New York County State of New York
Harry J. Haynsworth [view testimony] Chair, Drafting Committee on Uniform Law Enforcement Access to Entity Information Act Uniform Law Commission
http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.Hearing&Hearing_ID=ef10e125-2c1d-4344-baf1-07f6061611c1

Sunday, June 28, 2009

Former FINCEN agent says : US shell companies - It's time to end the hypocrisy


John Cassara is an expert in anti-money laundering and former FINCEN agent. In his blog he points out that finding beneficial owners of U.S. companies can be as difficult as in more famous offshore jurisdictions.

Bill S. 659 Incorporation Transparency and Law Enforcement Assistance Act is meant to improve record keeping of beneficial owners by State Divisions of Corporations, even though forming corporations is a state - not federal - power. Secretaries of State of Wyoming and other states have pointed out that they already complied with federal wishes to eliminate bearer shares and now they and small businesses are being asked to spend even more money in compliance.





Over the last few years, I have worked in approximately one dozen developing countries helping police, customs, and security services recognize and investigate money laundering and terror finance. During discussion periods, I am inevitably asked the following question. "Mr. John, my agency has a financial crimes investigation and the money trail leads to the American state of Delaware. We can't get any further information and don't know what to do. Can you help us?" As a former criminal investigator representing the United States, this question is, frankly, embarrassing.

From a money laundering and tax evasion standpoint, Delaware is not the only American state that has troubling incorporation and limited liability company (LLC) structures. In 2006, the US General Accountability Office (GAO) issued a report, "Company Formations: Minimal Ownership Information Is Collected and Available." (pdf) The report reviewed the legal requirements in all 50 states to set up corporations and LLCs, and found that most states failed to request beneficial ownership information. The GAO found that the absence of ownership information impeded law enforcement investigations of suspect corporations.

Some states seemingly compete against each other to see which can offer less accountability, less transparency, the most secrecy and, as a result, attract the most business and fees. Websites that offer incorporation services worldwide are touting US corporate secrecy. In transactions that can be completed over the internet in a few hours and for a few hundred dollars, corporations and LLCs can be formed in the US that provide many of the same secrecy provisions featured in traditional international tax and offshore havens.

US Senator Carl Levin (D-Michigan) has followed the issue closely. According to Senator Levin, "States allow persons to form nearly two million corporations and LLCs each year in this country without knowing – or even asking – who the beneficial owners are behind those corporations. Right now, a person forming a US corporation or LLC provides less information to the state than is required to open a bank account or obtain a driver's license."

The United States routinely points to other countries' anti-money laundering/counter-terrorist finance (AML/CFT) shortcomings. It has played a major role over the years in identifying "uncooperative" countries and jurisdictions and placing these countries on formal and informal "blacklists." Yet the proliferation of defacto shell corporations on American soil spotlights hypocrisy and undermines US policy.

For example, as noted in the recently released 2009 State Department International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) Volume II on Money Laundering, the British Virgin Islands and Hong Kong each have nearly 500,000 international business companies (IBCs) registered in their jurisdictions. The INCSR states the Dominican Republic, Grenada, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago plan to open "international financial centers," most of which offer the same services as offshore financial centers. In Panama, approximately 46,178 IBCs were registered in Panama in 2007. The INCSR continues that, "Panama has no requirement to disclose the beneficial owners of any corporation or trust; bearer shares are permitted for corporations; and nominee directors and trustees are allowed. The result is that illicit funds can be laundered and taxes evaded with little fear of detection and prosecution."

I am not an attorney skilled in the intricacies of international law, taxes, or finance. I don't understand the differences between LLCs, IBCs, IFCs, off shores, shell companies, and taxhavens. Maybe I am missing something. However, I know as a criminal investigator that following a dirty money trail to Delaware is about as difficult as following it to those jurisdictions criticized above by the US State Department.

When I was assigned to Treasury's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), I witnessed many requests for assistance from Egmont Group partner international Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) that had investigations focusing on Delaware. There was not much we could do.

Domestic law enforcement agencies are equally stymied. For example, according to 2006 Congressional testimony, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) reported that a Nevada-based corporation received more than 3,700 suspicious wire transfers totaling $81m over two years. However, the case was not prosecuted because investigators could not identify the corporation's owners.

In 2008, Department of Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff wrote to a Senate Subcommittee, "In countless investigations, where criminal targets utilize shell corporations, the lack of law enforcement's ability to gain access to true beneficial ownership information, slows, confuses, or impedes the efforts by investigators to follow criminal proceeds."

The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) has repeatedly criticized the United States for failing to comply with a FATF standard requiring beneficial ownership information.

Undoubtedly because company formations can be lucrative, nothing has been done. Perhaps things are about to change.

In March 2009, Sen. Carl Levin, D-Mich., Sen. Chuck Grassley, R.-Iowa, and Sen. Claire McCaskill, D-Mo., introduced the Incorporation Transparency and Law Enforcement Assistance Act to help law enforcement stop the misuse of U.S. corporations. Among its provisions, the bi-partisan Act (S.569) would require states to obtain a list of the beneficial owners of each corporation or LLC formed under their laws, ensure this information is updated annually, and provide the information to civil or criminal law enforcement upon receipt of a subpoena or summons. The Act would also require corporations and LLCs with non-US beneficial owners to provide a certification from an in-state formation agent that the agent has verified the identity of those owners.

As the Group of 20 prepares for a meeting in early April to try to improve global financial rules, there are reports that financial and tax havens of all sorts may receive scrutiny. As part of the process, I hope the United States is called to lift the veil of states' secrecy when it comes to corporate beneficial owners.

The current financial meltdown and a dangerous laxity in financial crimes enforcement should have taught us that we can no longer afford business as usual.

I suggest the American delegation at the Group of 20 headed by President Barack Obama should be guided by the following quote from then Senator Obama; "It's time for the United States to meet its international anti-money laundering commitments, and that means getting beneficial ownership information for US corporations."

Published in Complinet





S. 569, The Incorporation Transparency and Law Enforcement Assistance Act
S. 569 would ensure that persons who form corporations in the United States disclose the beneficial owners of those corporations, in order to prevent wrongdoers from exploiting United States corporations for criminal gain, to assist law enforcement in detecting, preventing, and punishing terrorism, money laundering, and other misconduct involving United States corporations.
http://www.washingtonwatch.com/bills/show/111_SN_569.html

National Association of Secretaries of State Congressional Activity: News Release: North Carolina Secretary Elaine Marshall Testifies Before U.S. Senate on State Business Incorporation Practices (06/18/09) * Testimony * More Testimony: Kansas Nevada Wyoming * NASS Company Formation Task Force

Concerns About 5.569 by Max Maxfield Wyoming Secretary of State: While we understand the premise of S.569; and while we applaud Senator Levin for his desire to better protect our country, we have serious concerns that the passage of S.569 will set Wyoming back in our efforts to fight fraud. We have the following serious concerns.
1. Our greatest concern is that if the federal law passes, there will be serious attempts to rescind Wyoming's laws. The argument will be that as long as a company meets the federal law that should be enough.
2. IfWyoming's laws were to be rescinded, we would lose the key component of requiring a human being in our State TO BE RESPONSIBLE FOR REPRESENTING THE COMPANIES THEY SERVE. We would be back to registered agents just being there for service of process, taking an otherwise hands off approach to the responsibility which they should shoulder.
3. If Wyoming's laws were to be rescinded, we would also lose the requirement that the registered agent have a contact person for each company they represent. We FIRMLY BELIEVE that a person leading you to another person is infinitely better than having paper on file. Fraudulent people file fraudulent paper; but a person face to face being held responsible generally knows of another person who can be contacted.
4. Whatever information is determined to be kept, it should be kept by the registered agent, not by government. This is a responsibility issue. States should not be taking the responsibility to know the players for each company; states are not forming these companies or using them for potential ill. Formation agents and the registered agents who are forming and making money off these companies (or the individuals themselves if the owner acts as his own registered agent) should be responsible for retaining and providing all required information. Without personal responsibility for the paper, the paper has very little value, except to make it APPEAR AS IF government is trying to locate the bad actors.

See also Levin - Obama Bill seeks to end confidentiality of US corporations

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